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A Shared Environment: German-German Relations along the Border, 1945-1972 
 
During the long warm summer of 1959, the local health authority in Hamburg banned 
people from swimming in the city’s main artery, the Elbe. According to officials, the 
river was ‘so dirty, that for most people even the thought of dipping one’s toes in 
appears ghastly’.1 A lot of the pollution was home grown, coming either from the 
city’s antiquated sewage system or from ships docked in the harbour. Hamburg’s near 
neighbour, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was also responsible for the 
river’s decay.2 After all, before reaching the Hanseatic city, the Elbe flowed for some 
500 kilometres through East German territory, collecting waste, chemicals and other 
debris on its journey westwards. On a far smaller scale, pollution also headed in the 
other direction, from west to east. Residents of East Berlin, for example, not only 
suffered from their own state’s environmental neglect, but also inherited damage from 
across the divide. Noise from jets landing at Tegel Airport as well as algae growth in 
the Teltow Canal caused by West Berlin’s sewage drew the ire of many in the Eastern 
half of the city.3  
Public anger at the pollution of the Elbe or the waterways of Berlin clearly 
demonstrated a nascent sense of environmental consciousness in both Germanys. 
However more importantly as far as this article is concerned, such incidents also 
highlighted, what Christoph Kleßmann has called ‘asymmetrical entanglement’ 
                                                 
1 ‘Baden in der Elbe wird niemals wieder erlaubt’, Hamburger Abendblatt (28 July 1959). 
2 ‘Gefahr! Die Elbe wird immer schmutziger’, Hamburger Abendblatt (16 July 1962). 
3 Abteilung Umweltschutz to Else Schmitt, 17 June 1977, Bundesarchiv Berlin (hereafter BArch 
Berlin), DK5/4399; ‘Information über wasserwirtschaftliche Probleme zwischen der DDR und 
Westberlin und Vorschläge für das weitere Vorgehen der DDR’, 19 June 1975, BArch Berlin, 
DY3023/1415. 
(asymmetrische Verflechtung), the idea that the two states remained connected while 
concurrently following different social, cultural and political policies.4 This was 
particularly true of the German environment. Although the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG) and the GDR applied their own approaches to landscape 
management, centuries of land cultivation and farming had sewn the German 
environment inextricably together. Even after fences, landmines and watchtowers 
began to carve the region apart, the environment still remained very much entwined. 
Along the full length of the border, rivers and lakes, forests and meadows continued 
to straddle the divide. Indeed, 52 main waterways ran between the two states.5  
Green campaigners, politicians and ordinary citizens in both East and West 
Germany were well aware of these environmental connections.6 Historical writing, 
however, has been far slower to recognise the extent of these entanglements. Instead, 
most histories of the German environment have followed a national paradigm and 
focused solely on either East or West Germany.7 In the few cases, where the two 
Germanys are considered together, the result has generally been a parallel history. As 
is the case with Sandra Chaney’s thoughtful discussion of Germany’s post-war 
                                                 
4 C. Kleßmann, ‘Spaltung und Verflechtung – Ein Konzept zur integrierten Nachkriegsgeschichte 1945 
bis 1990’, in C. Kleßmann and P. Lautzas (eds), Teilung und Integration: Die doppelte deutsche 
Nachkriegsgeschichte (Bonn 2005), 20-37, 30. 
5 Wasserwirtschaftsdirektion Werra-Gera-Unstrut to Amt für Wasserwirtschaft beim Ministerrat der 
DDR, 24 November 1966, BArch Berlin, DK5/1503b. 
6 P. Mayer (ed.), Die Luft hat keine Grenzen: internationale Umweltpolitik: Fakten und  Trends 
(Frankfurt 1986). On the GDR, see: P. Genath, “Es geht fast täglich auf den Brocken…!” Der 
Arbeitsalltag der Ranger im Nationalpark Hochharz aus volkskundlicher Perspektive (Münster 2005), 
89. 
7 Among the most important recent studies are: M. Cioc, The Rhine: An Eco-Biography, 1815-2000 
(Seattle 2002), 142-3; J. Engels, Naturpolitik in der Bundesrepublik: Ideenwelt und politische 
Verhaltensstile in Naturschutz und Umweltbewegung 1950-1980 (Paderborn 2006); A. Nelson, Cold 
War Ecology: Forests, Farms and People in the East German Landscape, 1945-1989 (New Haven 
2005). 
conservation movement, developments in one state tend to be sketched out before the 
parallel history across the border is added.8 The ‘other’ Germany, then, is left as a 
counterweight against which failures or successes can be measured. Astrid Eckert’s 
recent study of the polluted River Werra provides one notable exception to this model. 
Eckert demonstrates how ‘political circumstances’ on both sides of the border 
determined if and when politicians acted to protect the shared environment. For this 
reason, the focus of Eckert’s study is on the final two decades of division, during 
which time the two Germanys formally discussed the problems of cross-border 
pollution.9  
Yet, as this article contends, the shared German environment also needs to be 
viewed as one whole during the earlier period of division: from the end of the Second 
World War through until the late 1960s. Nowhere was this truer than along the inner-
German border, which also formed the dividing line in the Cold War. As is the case 
with most borderlands, the German border provided a space in which people, 
language and cultures ‘transcend[ed] the limits of the state’.10 People inhabiting the 
German border regions were only too aware of how connected their own environment 
                                                 
8 S. Chaney, ‘Protecting Nature in a Divided Nation: Conservation in the Two Germanys, 1945-1972’, 
in T. Zeller and T. Lekan (eds), Germany’s Nature: Cultural Landscapes and Environmental History 
(New Brunswick 2005), 207-243. See also: V. Grasnow, ‘The Greening of German-German 
Relations?’ in E. Kolinsky (ed.), The Greens in West Germany: Organisation and Policy Making 
(Oxford 1989), 141-158; J. Hamlin, ‘Environmentalism for the Atlantic Alliance: NATO’s 
Experiments for the Challenges of Modern Society’, Environmental History, 15, 1 (January 2010), 54-
75; A. Humm, Auf dem Weg zum sozialistischen Dorf? Zum Wandel der dörflichen Lebenswelt in der 
DDR von 1952-1969 mit vergleichenden Aspekten zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Göttingen 1999); 
W. Oberkrome, “Deutsche Heimat”: Nationale Konzeption und regionale Praxis von Naturschutz, 
Landschaftsgestaltung und Kulturpolitik in Westfalen-Lippe und Thüringen (1990-1960) (Paderborn 
2004). 
9 Astrid Eckert, ‘Geteilt, aber nicht unverbunden. Grenzgewässer als deutsch-deutsches 
Umweltproblem’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 62, 1 (January 2014), 69-99. 
10 H. Donnan and T. Wilson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State (Oxford 1999), 11-12. 
was with land across the divide. Small changes to streams or woods on one side of the 
border were often quickly felt by locals living on the other side. To effectively 
manage this environment, therefore, local people, rather than the state at this stage, 
often had to communicate with their neighbours living in the other Germany. 
By exploring the environment of the German borderlands during the Cold War 
as one of ‘asymmetrical entanglement’, it is possible to see many interactions between 
the two Germanys. Indeed, as this article maintains, the German environment actually 
had an integrative function, ensuring that both East and West Germans were forced to 
maintain some form of relationship across the divide. Managing forests, unblocking 
weirs and securing dikes was in the interest of people living on both sides of the 
border. Although this shared need rarely translated into genuine attempts at 
environmental protection, it brought East and West Germans together on a local level 
even at the height of Cold War tensions. On numerous occasions, representatives from 
the two states had to correspond or even meet to discuss environmental problems.  
In this sense, then, the article adds another layer to the complex history of 
informal inner-German relations. Work in this field has hitherto largely been confined 
to specific areas, such as trade, culture, the churches, cross-border transit and personal 
correspondence.11 The environment, as this article argues, should also be seen as an 
arena of East and West German negotiation during the Cold War. Discussions 
                                                 
11 P. Fäβler, Durch den “Eisernen Vorhang”: Die deutsch-deutschen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen 1949-
1969 (Cologne 2006); A. Schildt, D. Siegfried and K. Lammers (eds), Dynamische Zeiten: Die 60er 
Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften (Hamburg 2000); C. Lepp, Tabu der Einheit? Die Ost-
West-Gemeinschaft der evangelischen Christen und die deutsche Teilung (1945-1969) (Göttingen 
2005); G. Nositschka, Auf Wiedersehen in Leipzig: Deutsch-deutsche Freundschaften, 1961-1995 
(Bonn 1995); I. Dietzsch, Grenzen überschreiben? Deutsch-Deutsche Briefwechsel 1948-1989 
(Cologne 2004).  
between the two sides may not always have run smoothly. Indeed, by the early 1960s, 
there was considerable vitriol on both sides. Nonetheless, the closeness of 
neighbouring communities on a local level ensured that individuals and institutions 
across the divide had to find ways to accommodate themselves with one another. As 
recent work on German-Jewish history has suggested, negotiated forms of co-
existence helped to shape relations even against a backdrop of ambivalence and 
tensions.12 The article begins by exploring the two Germanys’ ultimately futile 
attempts to separate the environment during the period of state formation, before 
moving on to consider the ways in which environmental entanglements encouraged 
some cross-border dialogue. It concludes with the run up to the Basic Treaty of 1972, 
when increasing environmental damage sustained during the 1960s finally forced both 
Germanys to the negotiating table.  
 
The Allied occupation of Germany and concurrent division of the country into four 
zones was never supposed to be a permanent state of affairs, as the Potsdam 
Conference made clear. Despite these supposedly provisional arrangements, the 
Allies’ occupation managed to leave a visible imprint on the rural landscape. Forests 
were clear-cut, farmland redistributed and new agricultural management schemes 
introduced. In all these areas, policies differed between the Allied powers, but in 
particular between the Soviet zone of occupation and the three western zones. This 
                                                 
12 T. van Rahden, Juden und andere Breslauer: Die Beziehungen zwischen Juden, Protestanten und 
Katholiken in einer deutschen Großstadt von 1860 bis 1925 (Göttingen 2000); U. Baumann, ‘The 
Development and Destruction of a Social Institution: How Jews, Catholics and Protestants lived 
Together in Rural Baden, 1862-1940’, in H. Walser Smith (ed.), Protestants, Catholics and Jews in 
Germany, 1800-1914 (Oxford 2001), 297-315. 
trajectory of environmental separation continued following the formation of the FRG 
and the GDR in 1949. Yet such was the entanglement of the border landscapes in 
particular that it proved impossible for either state to carve out a completely separate 
German environment. 
When the victorious Allies first occupied their defeated foe in 1945, the land 
under their control carried many of the scars of war. A large number of dikes along 
the Elbe, for example, lay damaged either as a result of combat or a lack of general 
maintenance.13 In many cases, the Allied powers’ own occupation policies served 
only to worsen these problems. Rather than repairing the damaged Elbe dikes, the 
Soviet forces often built observation posts and placed markers on them, causing more 
damage as a result.14 And in the Western part of the country, the Allies were similarly 
quick to clear trees and to build barriers along the zonal border.15 
However, the Allied occupation of Germany was not just about taking 
physical control of the landscape. Each of the occupying powers also sought to exploit 
the natural resources that had come into their possession. One of the most visible 
signs of this policy of reparations occurred through the harvesting of Germany’s still 
relatively well-stocked woodlands. Each of the occupying powers sought to repatriate 
timber, often in large quantities, so as to allow their own forests to recover from 
wartime depletion. The Soviets proved particularly rapacious in this respect felling 
                                                 
13 Landrat des Kreises Hagnow to Präsidenten des Landes Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 21 September 
1945, Landeshauptarchiv Schwerin, 6.11-16, Nr.1387. 
14 Landesregierung Mecklenburg, Ministerium für Landwirtschaft to Chef der Verwaltung der SMA für 
das Land Mecklenburg, 19 January 1948, Landeshauptarchiv Schwerin, 6.12-1/6, Nr.629/1. 
15 E. Sheffer, Burned Bridge: How East and West Germans made the Iron Curtain (Oxford 2011), 37. 
more timber for reparations and military use than had been originally agreed.16 In all 
zones, much of the clear-cut land was replanted with fast growing evergreen varieties 
rather than deciduous varieties that had made up much of the older forests.17 The 
period of Allied occupation, therefore, brought about significant changes to the 
environment as each of the occupying powers prioritised their own needs and values 
in their exploitation of Germany’s natural resources.  
Land reform was another early impulse that gradually shaped the structure of 
the environment on both sides of the border. The policy itself had first been discussed, 
albeit briefly, at the Potsdam Conference, mainly as a means to break the supposed 
power of the Junker class. As with the reparations strategy, though, the actual 
implementation of this policy differed from zone to zone. In 1945, the British began 
to plan land reform with some enthusiasm but in the end implemented little of 
substance. They feared rightly that deep intrusions into rural society would damage 
economic productivity and risked causing widespread resentment too.18 In the Soviet 
zone of occupation, meanwhile, land reform was pushed through in a much more 
ruthless fashion. Within a few months of the collapse of National Socialist Germany, 
the Soviet forces began to replace large landowners with small scale farmers. In 
                                                 
16 A. Milnik, In Verantwortung für den Wald: Die Geschichte der Forstwirtschaft in der Sowjetischen 
Besatzungszone und in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (2nd edn, Remagen 2013), 96. 
17 Nelson, Cold War Ecology, 46. 
18 J. Farquharson, ‘Land Reform in the British Zone, 1945-1947’, German History, 6, 1 (January 1988), 
35-56, 36. 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern alone, 77,178 new farms were carved out of the existing 
land reserves.19  
These two different approaches to land reform dramatically altered population 
structures in the border region, particularly along the Eastern side of the divide. Under 
the plans of the Soviet forces, which the SED (Socialist Unity Party) later continued, 
long-standing land owners were forced to make way for new farmers. Many of these 
had either little agricultural experience or were expellees from Eastern Europe. The 
new farmers may have been able to grow corn on the Baltic flatlands, but they had 
little understanding of how to rear livestock along the banks of the Elbe. One former 
East Prussian farmer, who had resettled in Horst, across the border from Lauenburg, 
bemoaned the quality of the fields allocated to him.20 ‘I will stop running this farm 
immediately’, if things do not improve, he threatened. What compounded the 
problems of these population shifts was the SED’s determination to secure its border 
with the FRG which saw several thousand people who had been deemed 
untrustworthy resettled further inland.21 These continual movements, both into and 
out of, the border regions left their mark on Germany’s landscapes. Visible 
differences began to emerge between the East, where the population and agricultural 
methods were going through a period of sustained change, and the more stable West.  
Yet along the border, the Allies’ economic and political policies had less of an 
effect on the local landscape. What continued to shape attitudes to the environment in 
                                                 
19 S. Kuntsche, ‘Bodenreform in einem Kernland des Groβgrundbesitzes: Mecklenburg-Vorpommern’, 
in A. Bauernkämper (ed.), ‘Junkerland in Bauernhand?’ Durchführung, Auswirkungen und Stellenwert 
der Bodenreform in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone (Stuttgart 1996), 51-68, 55. 
20 Kaddig to Meckl. Ministerium für Landwirtschaft, 11 June 1950, Landeshauptarchiv Schwerin, 6.11-
16, Nr.1707. 
21 I. Bennewitz and R. Potratz, Zwangsaussiedlungen an der innerdeutschen Grenze (Berlin 1994), 7. 
these regions was the existence of previous incarnations of the German nation, rather 
than the actions of either the FRG or the GDR.22 When the Allies first established the 
post-war demarcation line, they largely chose to follow the historic contours of the 
individual German states, from Prussia through to Bavaria. And as the so-called 
‘green border’ between the FRG and the GDR was initially open, there appeared to be 
far more continuity than change. The landscape of the border regions did little to alter 
this impression. Along its entire length, there were few distinct geographical markers, 
such as mountain ranges or rivers, the Elbe excepted. As a result, geological and 
environmental features on one side of the border were generally replicated on the 
other. In short, the natural environment was not confined by the border, but stretched 
across the political divide. 
In the northern uplands of Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg, the border 
between the GDR and the FRG ran through a wetland environment. As it tore through 
this region, it cut across streams, rivers and lakes. The large Schaalsee, for example, 
was split in two by the border, while the smaller Mechower See and Golden See were 
East German, apart from their Western shores which belonged to the FRG. Despite 
the separation of territory between East and West, these wetlands continued to 
function as one biological entity.23 The same was true further south. The forests and 
dramatic hills of the Harz were cut apart by the border which ran for around 50 
kilometres through the middle of the region. However, as with the lakes and rivers of 
                                                 
22 See: M. Fulbrook, German National Identity after the Holocaust (Cambridge 1999). 
23 The biological systems of these inland waters remained intact: M. Zettler, ‘Zur Verbreitung der 
Malacostraca (Crustacea) in den Binnen- und Küstengewässern von Mecklenburg-Vorpommern’, 
Lauterbornia, 32 (1998), 49-65; H. Klapper, ‘Zu einigen Problemen der biologischen Wasseranalyse. 
Nach Untersuchungen im Einzugsgebiet Mittlere Elbe-Sude-Elde’, Internationale Revue der gesamten 
Hydrobiologie und Hydrographie, 48, 1 (January 1963), 9-34. 
Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg, the environment of the Harz remained 
entwined as one. Indeed, in the depths of this wooded landscape, it was hard for the 
causal visitor to distinguish where the two states even parted.24 
It was not just geographical features that sewed the environment of the border 
regions together. Over the centuries, human activity had helped to shape the forests, 
rivers and lakes that straddled the divide too. Fields had been carved from the 
landscape and paths formed that paid little attention to where the Allies later chose to 
place the dividing line between the four zones of occupation. In the Bavarian village 
of Ottendorf, for example, 16 farmers owned fields and woodlands just inside 
Thuringia. Previously the distribution of their land between Bavaria and Thuringia 
had caused few problems, but with the erection of the zonal border, the farmers could 
only access their fields by travelling to the nearest checkpoint. In some cases, this 
turned a twenty minute stroll into a three hour hike.25 In other areas, man-made 
environmental features even signified the demarcation line. This was the case between 
Lauenburg and Witzeeze in Schleswig-Holstein, where the medieval Stecknitz Canal 
served this purpose. Originally built to serve the salt industry, from 1945 this 
fourteenth century industrial relic marked the zonal border between East and West.26   
The historic development of the German environment, from its geological 
features through to its man-made additions, ensured that the border regions remained 
                                                 
24 R. Schneider, ‘Ein zerschnittenes Gebirge: Der Harz’, in H. Rudolph (ed.), Wo Deutschland geteilt 
ist: Beiderseits der innerdeutschen Grenze (Bonn 1984), 54-7. 
25 Letter to Landwirtschaftsminister der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 12 July 1951, BArch 
Berlin, DK1/8729. 
26 G. Peinemann, ‘Die Delvenau heute… Ein Bach mit Vergangenheit…und mit Zukunft?’, in W. 
Boehart, C. Bornefeld and C. Lopau (eds), Die Geschichte der Stecknitz-Fahrt, 1398-1998 
(Schwarzenbek 1998), 142-4. 
deeply entangled. Indeed, even as physical divisions between the GDR and the FRG 
grew, with the erection of an ever more secure border regime, the environment of 
these regions maintained a strong symbiosis. This was most evident from the 
continued flow of rivers and the spread of forests across the divide. Yet it also applied 
to man-made landscape features. All along the border, physical structures that had 
been built in earlier times to control or to harness the environment continued to work 
in tandem.  
One of the most well-known examples of this phenomenon existed in the 
Eichsfeld where the West German town of Duderstadt received its drinking water 
from Kreis Worbis in the GDR. In the late 1920s, as water demand had increased in 
Duderstadt, the town council had managed to find an alternative supply from a new 
well, which was only eight kilometres to the east, but actually lay in Thuringia. All 
would have been fine with this system had the state boundary separating Lower 
Saxony from Thuringia not become the Cold War border. Nonetheless, during the first 
decade of separation, Duderstadt experienced few difficulties with this arrangement. 
The physical border that split the Eichsfeld in two may have hardened as the 1950s 
progressed, but at the same time the water pipes below the ground continued to 
transport water from one side to the other.27 
The Elbe offers a similar story of environmental interdependence. During the 
late nineteenth century, engineers had begun to develop a comprehensive system of 
dikes and barriers along the Middle and Lower Elbe. These schemes had a twin 
                                                 
27 D. Denecke, ‘Das Eichsfeld - Landschaftsräumliche Strukturen und Beziehungsgefüge eines 
Grenzraumes in historisch-geographischer Perspektive’, in P. Aufgebauer et al. (eds), Das Eichsfeld: 
Ein deutscher Grenzraum (Duderstadt 2002), 7-46, 21. 
purpose: to protect local inhabitants from flooding and to create more agricultural 
land alongside the river.28 The interwar years saw further attempts at land and water 
management along the Elbe. The river itself was deepened and the height of dikes 
alongside low-lying areas increased. After 1945, and with the onset of the Cold War, 
the dikes and ditches that had been developed over the preceding half century 
continued to protect farmland and settlements. In short, although Germany’s political 
constellation had shifted, pre-war environmental management schemes remained in 
situ. Thus, when high tides threatened the flood plains around Lauenburg, the Elbe 
dikes shepherded water upstream, where banks and ditches, which now lay in the 
GDR, dissipated the risk.29 
In 1955, the FRG adopted the policy of the Hallstein doctrine. This was 
effectively a means to keep the GDR isolated on the international stage. As Konrad 
Adenauer explained to the West German parliament, the BRD would view recognition 
of the GDR by a foreign state ‘as an unfriendly act’.30 Adenauer’s announcement 
provided one of the clearest signs of Germany’s deepening division. Yet while the 
two German states may have been gradually drifting apart, the shared environment, 
particularly along the border regions, remained largely intact. Working practices and 
the basic infrastructure for the management of the local environment, which had been 
put in place during previous eras of German history, could not simply be split apart. 
                                                 
28 G. Häuβler, ‘Beiträge zur Kenntnis der Stromlaufveränderungen der mittleren Elbe’, unpublished 
PhD thesis, University Halle-Wittenberg (1907), 14, 18. 
29 G. Kaufmann, ‘Zur Kulturgeschichte am Unterlauf der Elbe’, in G. Asmus (ed.), Die Elbe: Ein 
Lebenslauf (Berlin 1992), 100-7, 101. 
30 Konrad Adenauer, 22 September 1955, in Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages und des 
Bundesrates, 2. Wahlperiode (1953-1957) (Munich 1953-1995), 5646.  
Indeed, for flood defences to function or for drinking and waste water supplies to be 
maintained, the West and East German environments needed to work together. 
 
The deep entanglement of the German environment demanded some form of cross-
border communication. As a divided city, but also one built on a marshy plain, this 
was most obviously the case in Berlin. Yet it was the far less glamorous history of 
sewage that required the greatest levels of cooperation. During the first two decades 
of division, almost 80 percent of West Berlin’s effluent was cleaned in the East, while 
at the same time 30 million cubic meters of the GDR’s own wastewater passed 
through pipes that lay on the territory of West Berlin.31 With such a deeply enmeshed 
infrastructure, the authorities in the two Berlins had little option but to come together 
to ensure the system continued to function. A 1950 joint agreement provided the basis 
of this process, though it relied on a select group of Eastern and Western maintenance 
workers to keep the waste flowing.32  
Berlin may have provided the clearest example of the continued entanglement 
of Germany’s environment, but similar developments occurred on a local level along 
the entire length of the border. As was the case in Berlin, environmental difficulties 
that necessitated joint discussion originated from both sides of the divide. Forest fires, 
rabid animals or flood waters could emerge anywhere along the border and then 
                                                 
31 ‘Arbeitsgruppe zur Vorbereitung der Komplexberatung Berlin’, 27 February 1969, BArch Berlin, 
DK5/1496. See further: G. Kunze, Grenzerfahrungen: Kontakte zwischen dem Land Berlin und der 
DDR 1949-1989 (Berlin 1999), 233-4. 
32 ‘Bericht über Probleme auf dem Gebiet der Wasserwirtschaft, die das besondere Gebiet Westberlin 
betreffen’, [undated], BArch Berlin, DK5/637. 
quickly spread to the other side.33 In an attempt to mitigate the potential danger of 
such occurrences, local officials in the two Germanys were often forced into contact 
with one another.34 When a forest fire burned out of control on the Hessen border, for 
example, the authorities in Heiligenstadt contacted their opposite number in Eschwege 
to ask them to tackle the blaze from the other direction. Once the fire had been safely 
extinguished, the leader of Eschwege’s District Council in the West heaped praise on 
the authorities in Heiligenstadt in the East. I hope ‘that we will at the very least be 
able to maintain this form of good neighbourly help in the future should similar 
incidents occur’, he concluded.35 
The Elbe, although a very different landscape from the forests of the 
Eichsfeld, also saw German-German discussions in times of environmental crisis. The 
biggest threat came in the depths of winter when the river occasionally froze over. Not 
only did this bring an important transport artery to a halt, but drifting ice also 
threatened bridges and raised water levels. To mitigate this risk, which was a danger 
for communities on both sides of the border, the local waterways office in the GDR 
allowed West German ice breakers to visit. From the late 1940s through until the 
1970s, when the GDR acquired its own vessels, the West and East worked together to 
                                                 
33 On the spread of diseases, see for example: Heinrich Beckmann to Wirtschaftsministerium des 
Landes Schleswig-Holstein, 15 August 1969, KA Nr. 8888. On fires, see: Stellv. d. Vorsitzenden für 
Inneres to Meyer, 20 October 1967, Kreisarchiv Heiligenstadt, EA-HIG, 723. 
34 However, there tended to be little urgency to such discussions: Sheffer, Burned Bridge, 210. 
35 Landrat Landkreis Eschwege to Vorsitzende des Rates des Kreises Heiligenstadt, 9 April 1963, 
Kreisarchiv Heiligenstadt, EA-HIG, 402. 
keep the Elbe ice free.36 Protecting the local environment, it seems, could at times 
take priority over Cold War tensions. 
However, it was not just the threat of force majeure that led to direct 
discussions. Long-term landscape management plans also helped to foster the 
German-German relationship. During the 1950s, engineers in both the East and West 
worked on a variety of water management projects, designed to prevent local 
flooding, to regulate rivers and to drain wetlands for agricultural use. Where these 
proposals took place on, or near the border, then the local authorities across the divide 
often needed to be consulted too. As one East German engineer noted, every ‘river, 
including its tributaries has to be regarded as a whole’, rather than as two separate 
parts.37 This was fine in principle. What it meant in reality, though, was that 
representatives from the two Germanys would have to meet to share their river 
management plans. 
The GDR’s plans to reconfigure the flow of the River Jeetze near Salzwedel 
provided one early example of such cross-border environmental contact. The Jeetze, 
which feeds into the Elbe near Hitzacker had a long history of flooding. Not only 
farmland, but also major settlements, such as Dannenberg, Lüchow and Hitzacker 
itself were repeatedly left under water. To protect the historic town of Salzwedel, East 
German engineers planned to build new dikes south of the town and to redirect water 
into the Salzwedeler Dumme. Because these changes had the potential to raise water 
                                                 
36 Hegen to Heß, 11 February 1954, BArch Berlin, DO1 / 3848; Wasserstrassenamt Wittenberge, 
‘Überblick über den Zustand der Wasserstraße 1960-1973’, 15 July 1974, Landeshauptarchiv 
Schwerin, 7.13-5/4, Nr.198. 
37 VEB Wasserwirtschaft, Mittlere Elbe, ‘Bericht über gemeinsame Besprechungen betr. 
wasserwirtschaftlicher Maßnahmen entlang der Zonengrenze mit westdeutschen Stellen’, 28 October 
1954, BArch Berlin, DO1/3951. 
levels on the West German side of the border, the GDR suggested that the entire 
length of the Jeetze be expanded at the same time.38 
Cross-border environmental cooperation also took place in the reverse 
direction, from West to East. In late 1955, the West German state began work on a 
large barrage to dam the Elbe near Geesthacht. It was designed to stabilise the water 
level in Hamburg’s harbour and to enable larger ships to travel upstream towards 
Lauenburg.39 Although the scheme promised considerable economic benefits for West 
Germany, through improved transportation and trade, it looked destined to have the 
opposite effect on the GDR. As West German engineers calculated at the time, the 
new barrage would place large areas of low-lying land along the border and further 
into East German territory under water.40  
Despite Geesthacht lying fifteen kilometres downstream from the actual 
border, the East German authorities were well aware of the dangers that the new 
barrage posed. The SED’s party organ, Neues Deutschland, even published a helpful 
map of the areas threatened by what it called the FRG’s ‘irresponsible actions’. This 
showed 17,000 hectares of land to be at risk, stretching from the border town of 
Boizenburg all the way across to Hagenow.41 Certainly, a set of very real fears over 
flooding and the maintenance of agricultural land underpinned the SED’s complaints. 
Local farmers, for example, held a series of mass meeting in which they made their 
anger clear. As one person interviewed during these protests bemoaned, ‘if the plans 
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of the Bonn government are realised, we will never be free of water again’.42 Yet for 
local officials, the impending threat of environmental catastrophe also offered 
considerable propagandistic material. In local discourse, it was ‘the government in 
Bonn’ that had placed a dark cloud over the sanctity and economic productivity of the 
surrounding landscape. This ‘fertile agricultural land’ that helped to feed the citizens 
of the GDR was now set to be ‘drowned’ almost ‘overnight’.43 
In a similar fashion, local officials in the West also sought to portray the 
GDR’s environmental measures as a sign of vandalism on a grand scale. This was 
particularly evident when the GDR announced its plans for reconfiguring the Jeetze. 
West German residents living near the river argued that changes to the Jeetze would 
result in higher water levels and thus an increased risk of damage to property and 
land. Severe flooding along the Jeetze in 1954 only seemed to confirm locals’ fears 
that the ‘Eastern zone’ (Ostzone) was determined to change the ecological balance in 
the West.44 As a result, residents in the affected regions argued that their own 
politicians needed to work more closely with the East to develop joint proposals for 
the future of the river.45 
On one level, complaints about these two water management schemes 
highlighted growing differences in how Germans on both sides of the borders viewed 
their environment. No longer were local people viewing their regions as one small 
part of a much larger German landscape, but rather as something that had to be 
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protected from the machinations of the other Germany. Yet on quite another level 
disputes over the Geesthacht barrage and the Jeetze also forced the two sides to 
discuss solutions to shared environmental problems. Officials in both Germanys knew 
that if they were to realise their water improvement works, then they would have to 
reach across the divide. In both cases, the SED sought state-level discussion of these 
pressing environmental issues, presumably in the hope that this would force West 
German diplomatic recognition.   
However, with the FRG wedded to the Hallstein doctrine, dialogue was 
restricted entirely to a local level. The Jeetze development plan in particular resulted 
in a series of joint site surveys. The first two visits in March and October 1954 saw an 
East German delegation meet with West German water engineers in Lüneburg.46 The 
West Germans undertook a reciprocal visit to Stendal from where they undertook 
field trips to the Jeetze north of Salzwedel.47 West Germany’s construction of a 
barrage in Geesthacht also necessitated a number of joint meetings between local 
officials. Indeed as had been the case earlier in the decade with the Jeetze project, 
engineers from the East and West met numerous times to finalise their building 
plans.48 In many respects, an even stronger spirit of collegiality underpinned these 
discussions. During one meeting, for example, the participants not only sat down for 
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formal dialogue, but also undertook a spontaneous trip to examine the condition of 
local rivers.49  
When West German officials left the final cross border meeting of 1957, they 
were confident that they had sketched out a definitive plan for mitigating the effects 
of the barrage in Geesthacht. As one member of the FRG’s delegation remarked, 
relations with the ‘relevant authorities in the GDR can be described as good’.50 The 
strength of this relationship stemmed from Germany’s entangled environment. In the 
case of both the Geesthacht barrage and Jeetze schemes, complicated environmental 
problems required direct discussions. Besides actual meetings, local officials also 
regularly exchanged plans, drawings and reports on both projects.51 As this constant 
crisscrossing of information gathered pace, individuals across the divide started to 
form increasingly strong relations with their opposite numbers. In short, Germany’s 
environment not only physically crossed the two states, but also brought East and 
West Germans together as they sought to resolve landscape problems.  
 
The mid to late 1950s proved to be the high point in German-German environmental 
cooperation on a local level. From this point forward, relations between East and West 
German officials entered a period of sustained decline. They only started to pick up 
again in the early 1970s with the signing of the Basic Treaty in 1972. In the 
intervening period, direct meetings, discussions and planning about the management 
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of the shared German environment took place less frequently. Instead, when 
environmental problems occurred, which they frequently did, local officials tended to 
pass the issue up to their superiors rather than initiating dialogue themselves. In 1964, 
for example, residents in the West German town of Duderstadt discovered a sharp 
drop in their domestic water pressure which was fed from a spring on the GDR’s 
territory. When the town council demanded an explanation, the local East German 
authorities simply forwarded the issue on to a ministerial level.52 In less than a 
decade, the German environment had gone from being a point of German-German 
contact to another area of cross border tension. 
A major reason for the demise of local relations was the heating up of the Cold 
War. During the late 1950s, Nikita Khrushchev and Dwight D. Eisenhower, the 
leaders of the Soviet Union and the USA respectively, raised tensions between the 
global superpowers with the threat of nuclear annihilation. The two Germanys played 
their own role in raising diplomatic tensions. The formation of separate West and East 
German armies in 1955 and 1956 placed the two states firmly at the centre of the 
ideological conflict. People were now called up to defend themselves against the other 
Germany. As a sign of growing separation, both states also finally started to introduce 
their own pieces of environmental legislation. These new measures replaced the Reich 
Nature Protection Law (Reichsnaturschutzgesetz, RNG), which the National Socialist 
regime had introduced in June 1935 as a means to protect local areas from 
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development.53 The decision to withdraw the RNG may have helped both states to 
distance themselves from the former Nazi regime, but it also allowed them to 
demonstrate a determination to cement the growing inner-German divide. 
At the same time as these legal boundaries were hardening, the leaders of the 
GDR and the FRG also gradually began to stop speaking the language of 
reunification. For a long time, leading figures within the two states had spoken very 
publicly about the need to build a united Germany, but by the late 1950s Germans on 
both sides of the border spent more time on building up their own state than in trying 
to entice the other Germany. Against this backdrop of deteriorating international 
relations, contacts between local officials also started to dry up. The city council in 
Lübeck, for example, chose to ignore any letters from towns across the border and 
advised people to avoid all contact with the East.54  
Generational shifts also played a role in this process of separation.55 The turn 
of the decade saw a generation of West and East Germans enter the workplace and 
administration whose education had taken place almost entirely within a divided 
Germany. Whereas the older generations had developed their knowledge of water 
management or forestry from interwar practices, younger Germans were educated in 
two very different ideological systems. Soviet policymakers’ determination to create a 
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new education model in their zone quickly resulted in the emergence of schools that 
were ‘distinguishable from those of the Western zones’.56  
Compounding this growing educational divide was the fact that engineers and 
scientists in the East involved in land management found it difficult to keep abreast of 
international developments. The SED often imposed travel bans, while also restricting 
access to journals and conferences.57 During the first years of division, there had been 
a constant exchange of information and ideas between the two sides. In 1950, for 
example, representatives from the FRG and the GDR met first in Leipzig and then in 
Tübingen to discuss landscape and forestry cultivation techniques.58 However, by the 
end of the decade these exchanges had become increasingly rare, as first the West 
German courts banned the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and its associated 
bodies and then the SED began to restrict East German experts from travelling to the 
West.59 
Changes in personnel and methodology had a significant effect on working 
relations between local officials. This was the case with the barrage scheme in 
Geesthacht. Early discussions of the project involved a core group of engineers from 
the two Germanys who seemed to share many of the same ideas of design and 
approach. Indeed, after a meeting with their opposite numbers in Ludwigslust in 1957, 
West German officials reported back with some confidence that ‘agreement with the 
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SBZ [Soviet Zone of Occupation] representatives was reached on all […] points’.60 
However, in 1958 this relationship suddenly changed. West German engineers in 
Lauenburg were all set for further talks over the project. However, when they went 
down to the border to collect their East German partners, they were greeted not by the 
usual group, but instead by three gentlemen ‘who were unknown to us’. The GDR’s 
new representatives also brought with them a different concept for the barrage plan 
which involved altering dikes, canals and the size of a planned pumping station.61 
Security concerns appear to have prompted this particular change in personnel 
as not only were the participants switched but even the new engineers were forbidden 
from crossing the border to the West. As a consequence, discussions about the barrage 
were conducted on the border itself. The meeting ‘had to take place outside at the 
border gate’, complained one West German representative. ‘The large plans [for the 
project] were laid out on a table which had been set up in preparation alongside the 
gate’, he added.62 A similar development occurred during discussions for the Jeetze 
project. When it seemed that the engineers from East and West were becoming too 
familiar, the Ministry of the Interior in the GDR began to introduce restrictions. The 
official in charge complained that engineers had become too lax with sensitive 
information and called for ‘a tightening of checks which at the moment are missing’.63  
The change of personnel, either as a result of generational shifts or internal 
security pressures, led to the deterioration of local relations. Meetings and discussions 
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between East and West German engineers became less frequent. And when they did 
occur, they lacked the collegiality of earlier encounters. Nonetheless works to manage 
cross-border landscapes continued. Neither the FRG nor the GDR could risk the 
environmental damage that could occur if they abandoned maintenance and 
improvement works entirely. Water improvement measures, such as along the Elbe 
near Lauenburg, though, were no longer instigated in close conjunction with one 
other, but often as almost separate schemes. As one West German engineer remarked 
laconically, we know ‘nothing about the condition [of dikes] in the SBZ’.64 
With less communication across the divide, Germans living along the border 
found it easier to portray their local landscapes in increasingly separate terms. This 
could be seen particularly clearly from the public presentation of the border regions. 
In the mid-1950s, for example, the tourist office of Herzogtum Lauenburg launched a 
new initiative to encourage visitors to this border region. Through posters, brochures 
and pamphlets, the office attempted to market the natural beauty of the area 
surrounding the medieval old salt route (alte Salzstraβe) that ran from Lüneburg to 
Lübeck, practically in a line parallel to the border. The photographs in its literature of 
tranquil forests, shimmering lakes and historic buildings gave almost no indication 
that this region lay at the epicentre of the Cold War. As far as the tourist office was 
concerned this was now a firmly West German landscape, which had little connection 
to land in the East.65 
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At first glance, the SED’s decision to strengthen its border installations in August 
1961 only seemed to harden the process of environmental separation. The building 
spree began with the construction of the Berlin Wall and then continued across the 
GDR’s eastern border as the regime strengthened all its installations with the West. It 
built up the size of its militarised forces, approved the use of landmines and increased 
the number of watchtowers along the border.66 The formation of a stricter border 
regime brought local discussions between East and West Germany almost to a 
complete impasse. With the two states firmly sealed from the other, Germans on both 
sides of the border began to concentrate on finding a place for themselves in their own 
ideological system. Yet at the very moment that relations across the divide began to 
fade, a new set of environmental problems caused by the border itself started to 
emerge. These called for more, not less, cross-border communication. Once again, 
therefore, the environment continued to pull the two Germanys more closely together. 
The process of strengthening fortifications along the border had an immediate 
environmental impact in both the East and the West. In order to accommodate 
upgraded military installations, the East German regime had to turn the border regions 
into a militarised landscape. This meant clearing land of both natural and manmade 
obstructions. Around Geismar in Thuringia, 150 workers were employed to clear all 
trees from a new 100 meter border strip.67 Similar actions took place along the length 
of the inner German border. Where rivers or streams interrupted the border, then these 
too had to be integrated into the new fortification system. This was the case in the 
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Eichsfeld where the security forces either blocked or altered a number of small 
watercourses, often to the detriment of the local population. 
One farmer in the East German village of Glasehausen was so incensed by 
these changes to the existing environment that he penned a letter to the district 
authorities. Since the border had been strengthened, both his buildings and fields had 
suffered flooding. ‘This situation has come about’, he noted, ‘because surface water 
can no longer drain off to the West and instead accumulates on my low-lying land’.68 
The authorities denied all responsibility, suggesting instead that any flooding was 
caused by ‘an insufficient system of ditches’. Further north in Hötensleben, on the 
border with Lower Saxony, similar problems emerged. In this region, the authorities 
had to demolish a small sewage works to make room for the new fence. But instead of 
building an alternative, they simply pumped the village’s waste into a nearby 
stream.69 
During the 1960s, albeit on a much smaller scale, military installations were 
also enhanced in the West. As the GDR expanded its border controls, the FRG 
responded by increasing its patrols along the border, which carved their own path 
through the border landscape. ‘Events in Berlin’, noted one West German report, 
‘have naturally led the BGS [Federal Border Guard], the Federal Customs Authority 
and to some extent the British occupation forces to strengthen their control and 
observation activity’.70 However, as the West increased their motorised patrols, the 
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existing paths and tracks along the border tended to suffer from excessive use. Small 
tracks across fields and through forests had never been designed to handle the 
constant movement of military vehicles. Following protests from local landowners, 
the West German authorities had to build new roads or improve those already in 
place.71 On both sides of the border, therefore, the landscape was increasingly shaped 
to meet military demands.72 
The construction of an enhanced border regime also had a direct impact on the 
maintenance of the existing environment in these regions. As the border fortifications 
reached new heights, previously accessible land was suddenly placed out of reach. In 
the East, the biggest problem was the newly cleared border strip that became 
something of a no-man’s land. With access restricted to this zone, weeds quickly took 
hold and spread onto neighbouring agricultural land, much to the annoyance of local 
farmers.73 On the western side, similar problems also emerged. Where the 
strengthened border bisected waterways, people had difficulties in trying to access the 
banks or the water itself to undertake routine repairs. The western edge of the River 
Stecknitz, north of Lauenburg, for example, was in the FRG, whilst the eastern banks 
lay in the GDR. Without access to the opposite side of the river, it proved tricky for 
the local authorities in the FRG to clear growth from the water. They were forced to 
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utilise a floating digger and to take out special insurance for the workers due to the 
proximity of East German minefields.74  
The complexities of trying to maintain these hard to reach areas called for 
simpler solutions that avoided the need of running the gauntlet of border guards and 
minefields. Both the East and West German authorities saw a solution to this problem 
in the use of herbicides.75 These could be sprayed along river banks from a safe 
distance and, as a West German letter noted, ideally ‘without fish and fry being 
destroyed’ at the same time.76 For very different reasons, the authorities in the East 
also regularly sprayed the immediate border region. The aim here was to ensure that 
there was no chance of undergrowth providing hiding places for would be escapees.77  
The strengthening of the inner German border and the resultant propensity to 
use herbicides came at a particularly perilous time environmentally. By the 1960s, the 
environment of both states bore the scars of sustained post war economic growth. The 
Rhine, for example, home to petroleum giants, nuclear power plants and other 
industries had lost much of its biodiversity by the 1970s. The effects of rapid 
industrial growth in the two Germanys were also felt in the border regions.78 The 
potash industry, which existed in both East and West, proved particularly damaging in 
the border regions. The GDR, far more so than the FRG, simply pumped salt water 
from the extraction process into neighbouring rivers. The tributaries of the Elbe, 
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Saale, and Werra, which ran between the two states, suffered badly from these 
arrangements. By the 1970s, salt levels in the Werra were higher than in the North 
Sea.79 
With limited discussion between the two Germanys, on either a local or state 
level, the shared German environment was left in a state of decay. If anything, this 
silence made it easier for residents of the border regions to place the blame for 
environmental damage on the other Germany. From the perspective of the FRG, 
which suffered the brunt of cross-border pollution, this was easy to do. On numerous 
occasions, people living along the border demanded that the GDR maintain the local 
environment where it impacted on the West. Landowners around Lauenburg, for 
example, repeatedly complained about the damage wild animals, particularly boar and 
deer, caused to their crops and livestock. They held the GDR responsible, 
complaining that its failure to maintain land along the fortified border had led the wild 
animal population to spread out of control.80 At the same time, newspaper articles in 
the West were quick to highlight the environmental excesses of the neighbouring 
state. ‘ “GDR” Effluent Polluting the Weser’, read one West German headline, while 
another stated simply, ‘Ostpolitik: Salt in the Werra’.81 
Yet, while the West was busy berating the GDR, across the border a similiar 
discourse of environmental blame occurred only in reverse. Prominent East German 
newspapers, such as Neues Deutschland, made it clear to their readers where 
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culpability lay. ‘Pollution of the Saale by Effluent from the FRG’, exclaimed one 
caption.82 On a local level, people complained about West Germany’s management of 
the border regions, but increasingly also acknowledged that some of the 
environmental damage was entirely home-grown. In Heiligenstadt, for example, the 
town council received numerous letters of complaint (Eingaben) bemoaning the 
woeful state of local rivers.83 Even internal district reports recorded the extent of 
pollution. One described the River Leine, which flowed into West Germany, as a 
‘potent poisonous broth’ that showed ‘no signs of biological life’.84 
Ironically this low point in cross-border action on the environment also proved 
to be a prompt for greater discussions aimed at improving the shared German 
landscape. Public concern within the two Germanys, as well as growing international 
awareness of the fragility of the Earth’s resources, ensured that the issue of 
environmental protection featured prominently during the thawing of East-West 
relations during the early 1970s.85 When the final treaty between the GDR and FRG 
was eventually signed in 1972, the two sides agreed to work towards improving and 
promoting environmental cooperation.86 In reality, this proved to be a long, drawn-out 
process necessitating a series of further detailed discussions through the German 
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Grenzkommission, which was charged with resolving boundary and border queries 
affecting the two states.87 
In many respects, the strengthening of border fortifications during the 1960s 
appeared to curtail the possibility of further environmental discussions between the 
two Germanys. It not only proved difficult to negotiate across a militarised divide, but 
political will was largely missing too. However as the border became more secure, 
environmental decay only increased. Wetland landscapes were made inaccessible and 
in many cases rivers were also diverted. The scale of these problems for the FRG in 
particular ensured that the shared German environment became a point of contact 
during negotiations for the Basic Treaty. Indeed, the final Treaty enabled the two 
sides to discuss a series of cross-border environmental issues during the mid to late 
1970s.88 
 
In her work on nature protection in post-war Germany, Sandra Chaney examines the 
ways in which ‘two environments [gradually] emerged in the FRG and the GDR’.89 In 
many respects, Chaney is correct to introduce this idea of separatism. After 1945, first 
the Eastern and Western occupation zones and then the two German states did begin 
to carve out their own set of environmental principles. Different approaches to 
reparations, land reform and environmental legislation all helped to give the 
impression of separation. By the 1970s, as the Federal Republic started to target the 
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problem of pollution with ever greater vigour, the environment of the two states grew 
even further apart. Political and civil restrictions on the GDR’s citizens limited public 
discussion of environmental destruction at the same time that West Germans sought to 
protect nature.90 
Despite these very visible signs of separation, the environment of the two 
German states actually remained remarkably entwined. Nowhere was this more 
evident than in the spread of polluted water and air across the German-German 
border. West German holiday beaches along the Baltic Sea, for example, were badly 
damaged by East German industrial pollution. West German scientists discovered ten 
times the level of insecticide in seabirds along the Baltic than in the North Sea. This 
led the West German newsweekly, Der Spiegel, to label the Baltic the ‘world’s most 
polluted Inland Sea’.91 Such dramatic examples of cross-border pollution certainly 
helped to grab the public’s imagination. Yet there was nothing fundamentally new 
about this environmental entanglement. The history of the two post war German states 
is in many ways one of the environment. From the moment of division in 1945 
through to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the landscapes and infrastructure of the 
two states remained firmly entangled with the environment across the militarised 
border.  
What was crucial about this long period of environmental entanglement was 
that it formed a small part of informal inner-German relations during the early years 
of the Cold War. Discussion between the two Germanys, as this case demonstrates, 
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did not just involve trade negotiations, cultural exchanges or the interactions of the 
Christian churches, it was also about fighting forest fires, managing border rivers and 
controlling the spread of animal diseases. On a local level, East and West Germans 
living close to the border were only too aware that their own wellbeing required some 
form of dialogue with the other Germany. As much as the leaders of the two states 
may have wished, it proved impossible to isolate one part of the German landscape 
from its neighbour across the border. Negotiations about the future of the shared 
environment reached a highpoint in the mid 1950s. Against the wishes of both sides, 
then, the German environment acted not so much as a point of division, but as a site of 
German-German interaction. 
 
 
